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STATEMENT OF THE 
A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a post-divorce Motion to Divide Omitted Asset filed by 
Plaintiff I Respondent, Debra A. Borley, hereinafter "Debra." In her Motion to Divide 
Omitted Asset, Debra sought to divide a "retro-check" Defendant / Appellant, Kevin 
Smith, hereinafter, "Kevin," received from his employer after the parties' divorce was 
final, alleging the "check was a community asset that was not divided in the Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce." The magistrate court, in its Memorandum Decision determined 
that the proceeds received by Kevin were not omitted assets in the Property Settlement 
Agreement attached to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, but ordered a division of a 
portion of the proceeds received by Kevin anyway pursuant to a formula that was not set 
forth in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce or the Property Settlement Agreement. 
Kevin appealed the magistrate court's Memorandum Decision to the District 
Court contending the magistrate court had no jurisdiction to make a deiennination as to 
Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset because the Property Settlement Agreement 
attached to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was not merged with the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, and even if it was merged, the issue was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. Kevin further contended that all proceeds he received from his employer post- 
divorce was his sole and separate property. 
The District Court, in its Decision on Appeal, affim~ed the magistrate court's 
ruling that the Property Settlement Agreement was merged into the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce and further ruled the magistrate court had jurisdiction to modify the Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce. The District Court then ruled the magistrate court erred in 
applying the time rule method to divide certain retirement benefits received by Kevin 
post divorce where the Judgment and Decree of Divorce divided retirement assets using 
the accrued benefit method. Finally, the District Court ruled the magistrate court erred 
when it found the "stock aIlocation" received by Kevin post divorce was his separate 
property. 
Kevin appeals the District Court's decision regarding the issues of merger, res 
judicata and determination that compensation Kevin received from his employer post 
divorce was an omitted asset. 
B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN TIiE MAGISTRATE COURT 
On September 22,2005, the magistrate court filed a Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce in the above-entitled action that granted Debra and Kevin a divorce @om each 
other. (R. pp. 19 - 20). Aitached to that Judgment and Decree of Divorce was a Property 
Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties on September 15,2005 that divided all 
of the parties' marital property and debt which the court approved in the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. (R. pp. 21 - 29). On March 24,2006, Debra filed a Motion to Divide 
Omitted Asset. (Stipulation to Augment Record filed February 4,2009, Exhibit "A,"). 
On March 27,2007, Kevin filed a Motion for Sununary Judgment (Stipulation to 
Augment Record filed February 4,2009, Exhibit "E."). On April 26,2007, the 
magistrate court filed a Stipulation to Vacate Trial; Take TeIephonic Deposition and 
Order wherein the parties agreed to submit a Stipulation of Facts to the magistrate court 
along with memorandums in support of their legal positions. (Stipulation to Augment 
Record filed February 4,2009, Exhibit "1."). On August 1,2007, the parties filed 
Plaintiffs and Defendant's Stipulated Facts. (Stipulation to Augment Record filed 
February 4,2009, Exhibit "J."). The parties then submitted their Memorandum in 
Support of their legal positions. 
On October 10, 2007, the magistrate court filed its Order Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. (R. pp. 43 - 45). On 
November 28,2007, Kevin filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. pp. 46 - 48). On December 
28,2007, Debra filed her Notice of Cross Appeal. (R. pp. 49 - 51). 
C. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
On August 21,2008, the District Court heard oral argument on Kevin's appeal 
I and Debra's Cross-Appeal. (R. p. 52). On September iO, 2008, the District Court filed is 
Decision on Appeal. (R. pp. 52 - 66). On October 8,2008, Kevin filed his Notice of 
Appeal. (R. pp. 67 - 69). On October 29,2008, Debra filed her Notice of Cross Appeal. 
(R. pp. 70 - 72). 
D. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced by a Judgment and Decree of Divorce filed on 
September 22,2005. Paragraph 2 of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce specifically 
states: 
2. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: The Property 
Settlement Agreement dated September 15,2005 is approved by this 
court. The Property Settlement Agreement is approved by this Court, but 
it is not mewed nor incorporated into this Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce. A copy of that Agreement is attached hereto. The parties have 
provided all of the terms of the said Agreement. (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 19 - 20). The Judgment and Decree of Divorce was drafted by Debra's counsel. 
It is important to note that pursuant to the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement 
entered into by the parties, Kevin received $135,152.00 cf the net community and Debra 
received $301,990.00 of the net cormnunity. (R. p. 29). Paragraph !O of the Property 
Settlemelit provides: 
10. AGREETvIZNT TO BE MERGED: The parties hereto agree that 
in the event a divorce is entered, the original of this Agreement will be 
submitted to the court for approval and the parties hereto will request that 
this Agreement be merged and incorporated and made a part of the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. (Emphasis added). 
(R. p. 24). 
In the parties' Property Settlement Agreement dated September 15,2005, Kevin's 
retirement benefits through United Airlines were divided as follows: 
4. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS. Husband has been 
employed by United Airlines and has a pension, either with United 
Airlines, or now with Pension Benefit Guarantee Association. Wife shall 
receive fifty percent (50%) of the benefit accumulated by Husband during 
the maniage to be set over to her pursuant to a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order. 
(R. p. 22). The Property Settlement Agreement divided the parties' income as follows: 
13. SEPARATE PROPERTYIINCOME AFTER SIGNING OF 
AGREEMENT: The parties hereto stipulate and agree that from and 
after the date of the signing of this Agreement, any and dl property or 
income acquired or earned by either party hereto shall be the separate 
property of the party who has acquired or earned it and the other party 
shall have no claim thereon. The parties agree that any income earned 
by either party after the date of signing this Agreement shall be the 
viii 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard 
of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment. Eagle Water Co~npany, Znc. v. Roundy 
Pole Fence Company, Inc., 134 Idaho 626,7 P.3d 1103 (2000). All 
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving 
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Id. If there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, only a question of law remains. over which this Court exercises free 
e. Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475,20 P.3d 1 1 (2001). 
(Emphasis added). 
137 Idaho at 47. In this action, there is no dispute as to the facts as the parties 
submitted stipulated facts to the Court. As such, this appeal consists of questions of 
law over which the Court exercises free review. 
In Can v. Carr, 116 Idaho 754,779 P.2d 429 (App. 1989), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held: 
On appeal from the district court reviewing a magistrate's findings 
and conclusions, we examine the record of the trial court inde~endently 
of, but with dueregard for, the district court's intermediate Gel la te  
decision. Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,768 P.2d 815 (Ct.App. 1989). 
Findings of fact made by the magistrate will not be disturbed on appeal 
where they are supported by substantial and competent, although 
conflicting, evidence. Salazar v. Tilley, 110 Idaho 584, 716 P.2d 1356 
(Ct.App. 1986). As to questions of law, we will exercise free review. 
Cole v. Kunzler, supra. Furthermore, an appellate court must afford 
deference to a trial court's opportunity to assess the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight of evidence presented at trial; on review, this 
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Court is precluded &om substituting its opinion for that of the trier of 
fact. See Salazar v. Tilley, supra. Depending upon our analysis, we will 
either affirm or reverse the district court accordingly. Matter of the 
Estate of Bradley, 107 Idaho 860,693 P.2d 1062 (Ct. App. 1984). 
116 Idaho at 756. 
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY 
RULED THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE 
PARTIES WAS MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
FILED ON SEPTEMBER 22,2005. 
In the Memorandum Decision filed in this action on October 10,2007, the 
magistrate court ruled: 
Therefore based on the doctrine set forth in Phillips v. Phillips supra 
this particular property settlement agreement is deemed to be merged 
into the decree of divorce and is not integrated which allows this court to 
interpret and/or modify the same. 
(R. p. 36). The holding by the Supreme Court in Phillios v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,462 
P.2d 49 (1969), that the magistrate court based its decision states: 
We, therefore, hold that when parties enter into an agreement of 
separation in contemplation of divorce and thereafter the agreement is 
presented to a district court in which a divorce action is pending and the 
court is requested to approve, ratify or confirm the agreement, certain 
presumptions arise. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary, it will be presumed that each provision of such an 
agreement is independent of all other provisions and that such agreement 
is not integrated; it will be further presumed that the agreement is 
merged into the decree of divorce, is enforceable as a part thereof and if 
necessary may be modified by the court in the future. (Emphasis added). 
93 Idaho at 387. In Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,462 P.2d 49 (1969), the record 
did disclose the intent of the parties as to the issue of merger. The Idaho Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
In the case at bar the record discloses no clear intent ofthe parties 
relating to 'integration' and 'merger.' We, therefore, presume that the 
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district court had continuing jurisdiction to modify the divorce dec-- .,e on 
proper motion and showing therefor. 
93 Idaho at 387. In contrast, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce filed in the action 
specifically stated in paragraph 2 as follows: 
The Property Settlement Agreement is approved by this Court, but is not 
merged nor incomorated into this Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
(Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 19 - 20). 
The magistrate court rriled that since no clear and convincing evidence was 
presented, the Property Settlement Agreement was presumed to be merged stating: 
Since there is no clear and convincing evidence as to whether or not 
this agreement was to be merged then the presumptions that arise under 
the Phillips doctrine would prevail and indicate that in fact the merger 
did take place in the absence of clear and convincing evidence 
otherwise. 
(R. p. 36). No clear and convincing evidence needed to be presented to the magistrate 
court as to the merger issue because the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in 
unambiguous and is not subject to interpretation. In Tovama v. Tovama, 129 Idaho 
142,922 P.2d 1068 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
As this Court has previously held, the rules of construction of 
contracts apply equally to the interpretation of divorce decrees. 
DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63,65,714 P.2d 32,34 (1986). If the 
language of the decree is clear and unambiguous, determination of the its 
meaning and legal effect is a question of law upon which this Court 
exercises free review. Id. If, on the other hand, the language of the 
decree is reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations, it is 
considered ambiguous, and the determination of its meaning is a 
question of fact. Id 714 P.2d at 34. In that case, the magistrate's 
interpretation of the decree will be upheld if supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Ireland, 123 Idaho at 958,855 P.2d at 43. 
129 Idaho at 144. Since the Judgment and Decree of Divorce is unambiguous and not 
subject to interpretation, there is question of fact before the court thereby negating 
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the need to present any evidence on the issue. The fact that the Property Settlement 
Agreement contains language stating that the parties would reauest that the Property 
Settlement Agreement be merged is of no consequence as it is the language in the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce that controls. 
The District Court, in its Decision on Appeal affirming the Magistrate Court's 
determination that the Property Settlement Agreement is merged into the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce held: 
Smith argues that because the language in the Judmnent and Divorce 
Decree is unambiguous, the Court must exercise free review over the 
magistrate court's decision. This argument is misplaced. It is true that the 
language of the divorce decree when taken alone is unambiguous, hut in 
making his determination the magistrate court considered both the 
agreement and the decree. When these two documents are read together 
they are ambiguous as to the parties' intent. Consequently, their 
interpretation is a question of fact and the Court must review the 
magistrate court's findings only to determine whether they were based on 
substantial and competent evidence. The Court finds his findings are 
based on substantial competent evidence and, therefore, the Court upholds 
his determination. 
(R. p. 61). In so ruling, the District Court did not take into account the "doctrine of 
merger." In Davidson v. Davidson, 91 6 S.W.2d 91 8 (Tennessee App. 1995), the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals held: 
Wife further asserts that since the QDRO and the MDA are agreements 
respecting the sane subject matter, the doctrine of merger applies. She 
correctly cites Magnolia Group v. Metropolitan Dev. And Hous. Agency, 
783 S.W.2d 563,566 (Tenn.App. 1989), for the proposition that ''W 
agreement concerning the same subject matter that has been simed by all 
parties supersedes all former agreements, and the last contract is the one 
that embodies the true agreement." (Emphasis added). 
916 S.W.2d at 922. The last agreement signed by all parties was the Stipulation of the 
parties for the Court to enter the Judgment and Decree of Divorce that specifically stated 
the Property Settlement Agreement was not merged or incorporated into the Judgment 
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and Decree of Divorce. (R. pp. 19 - 20). Therefore, it is the language contained in the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce that controls. It should also be noted that if the 
Property Settlement Agreement was merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, 
because of the disparity of the division, the Court would have had to make findings 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 32-712 that there were compelling reasons for the disparity in 
the property division. No such findings were made. 
111. 
EVEN IF THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WERE TO BE 
In McBride v. McBride, 112 Idaho 959,739 P.2d 258 (1987), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
In the absence of an appeal from an original decree of divorce the 
property division portions of that decree are final, res iudicata, and no 
jddict ion exists to modify propertv provisions of a divorce decree. 
Sullivan v. Sullivan 102 Idaho 737, 639 P.2d 435 (1981); Paul v. Paul 97 
Idaho 889 556 P.2d 365 (1976); Lowe v. Lowe 92 Idaho 208,440 P.2d 
141 (1968). That rule has been modified in circumstances 
demonstrating fraud, coercion, or overreaching, but no such 
circumstances are alleged or demonstrated here. (Emphasis added). 
112 Idaho at 961. While the magistrate court properly cited McBride v. McBride, 112 
Idaho 959,739 P.2d 258 (1987) in its Memorandum Decision, the Court went on to 
state: 
It is also unquestioned that causes of action for divorce are actions in 
equity. McHugh vs. McHu~h, 115 Idaho 198, Rudd vs. Rudd, 105 Idaho 
112. 
In the McHugh vs. McHugh supra case the Idaho Supreme Court 
cited with approval the statements made in the California Court of 
Appeals case of Huddleston vs. Huddleston, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1564 by 
stating "Wherein the court noted the special treatment courts accord in 
equity actions, stating that an action to divide an omitted asset, in the 
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context of a divorce proceeding, is an action in equity, and that such 
does not seek to modify or reopen the previous final judgment of 
dissolution." 
Clearly, this court has the equitable jurisdiction to consider a claim 
for an omitted asset pursuant to the above referenced case authority. 
(R. p. 37). While the Court has jurisdiction to determine a claim for an omitted asset, 
that jurisdiction exists a f  there is an omitted asset. In this action, the magistrate 
cout found the convertible notes were not an omitted asset stating: 
This court believes that in fact this is not an omitted asset but rather 
controlled by varagravh four under the division of retirement benefit and 
specifically under amounts to be received from United Airlines. 
(Emphasis added). 
(R. p. 39). Paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement states: 
4. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS. Husband has been 
employed by United Airlines and has a pension, either with 
United Airlines, or now with Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Association. Wife shall receive 50% of the benefit accumulated 
by husband during the marriage to be set over to her pursuant to 
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. 
jR. p. 22, paragraph 4). 
As soon as the magistrale court determined that the convertible notes were not 
an omitted asset and were in fact divided pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Property 
Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties, the magistrate court should have 
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to proceed any further pursuant to the doctrine of res 
judicata. Instead, the magistrate court ruled that the convertible notes should be 
divided in a manner not contemplated by the Property Settlement Agreement stating: 
Clearly Debra has no right to receive any retirement benefits accrued 
by Kevin after the day of divorce and therefore any proceeds received by 
Kevin through the convertible notes sale and distribution would have to be 
calculated by multiplying the amount of the distribution by the fraction of 
Kevin's age at the date of divorce over 60 (the age for mandatory 
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retirement). Thereafter, the resulting fractional share would then be 
divided by 50% to achieve the community distribution to Debra. 
(R. p. 10). 
The District Court in its Decision on Appeal ruled as follows: 
. . . [Tlhe magistrate court determined that the convertible notes and 
stock allocation were not omitted and then proceeded to enforce the decree 
bv allocating the assets under the terms of the settlement agreement. At 
the outset, the magistrate con? retained equitable jurisdiction to consider 
[Debra'slmotion to divide an omitted asset. Secondly, the nagistrate 
cwurt had continuing iurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the divorce 
decree since all provisions of a divorce decree are generally enforceable 
by the trial court under Idaho law, including orders to effectuate property 
divisions between the partiers. Ratkowski v. Ratkowski, 115 Idaho 692, 
294,769 P.2d 569,571(1989) (quoting McDonaldv. McDonald, 55 Idaho 
102, 114,39 P.2d 293,298 (1934)); Carr, 116 Idaho at 751, 779 P.2d at 
426. (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 11 - 12). Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset m t  request that the 
magistrate court enforce the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. (Stipulation to Augment 
Record filed February 4,2009, Exhibit "A.") No allegation was alleged by Debra that 
Debra was awarded an asset in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce and Kevin refused to 
give Debra her share of that asset. Therefore, no enforcement was sought. If Debra was 
seeking to enforce the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, she should have alleged a claim 
for enforcement. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). The sole allegation was that Kevin had received 
an "omitted asset" that should have been divided in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
and requested the Court divide that omitted asset. The magistrate court found the 
convertible notes were not an oinitted asset as they were covered by paragraph 4 of the 
Property Settlement Agreement. As such, the convertible notes were already divided and 
therefore, could not be re-divided again. The magistrate court did not attempt to enforce 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce by requiring Kevin to do some act required by the 
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Judgment and Decree of Divorce. The magistrate court did attempt to divide the 
convertible notes pursuant to the "time rule" method and the District Court correctly 
ruled that pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement any community 
portion of the convertible notes should have been divided pursuant to the "accrued 
benefit method." (R. p. 13). However, the magistrate court erred in making any effort to 
divide the convertible notes as it had no jurisdiction to do so based on res judicata. 
IV. 
THE CONVERTIBLE NOTES ARE KEVIN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY 
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 13 OF THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE, THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED 
IN AWARDING DEBRA A POXTION OF THE NOTES. 
"In order for [Kevin] to receive convertible note distributions I allocations, 
[Kevin] must have been employed on February 1,2006, and have been a qualified 
member of the A Plan as of December 30,2004." (Stipulation to Augment Record filed 
February 4,2009, Exhibit "J"; Plaintiffs and Defendant's Stipulated Facts filed August 
1,2007, p. 6, paragraph 16). Paragraph 4 of the Property Settleinent Agreement 
provides in part: 
4. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS. Husband has been 
employed by United Airlines and has a pension, either with United 
Airlines, or now with Pension Benefit Guarantee Association. Wife 
shall receive fifty percent (50%) of the benefit accumulated bv Husband 
during the marriage to be set over to her pursuant to a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. (Emphasis added). 
(R. p. 22). The convertible notes were not accumulated by Kevin during the marriage 
as he was not eligible to receive them unless he was employed by United Airlines on 
February 1,2006 which was after the parties were divorced. Therefore, pursuant to 
paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement, the convertible notes are his 
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separate property. 
Further, paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement provides: 
13. SEPARATE PROPERTY/INCOME AFTER SIGNING OF 
AGREEMENT: The parties hereto stipulate and agree that from and 
after the date of the signing of this agreement, any and all property and 
any income acquired or earned bv either party hereto shall be the 
separate property of the party who has acquired or earned it and the 
parties shall have no claim thereon. The parties agree that any income 
earned by either party after the date of signing this agreement shall be 
the separate property of the party earning the income, and any income or 
separate property shall be separate property from and after the date of 
the signing of this agreement. (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 24 - 25). Had Kevin left his employment with United Airlines prior to February 
1,2006, he would not have received the convertible notes. As such, Kevin had to 
continue his employment with United Airlines after the date of divorce in September, 
2005. Therefore, the convertib!e notes were both earned and acquired after the date of 
divorce and are Kevin's separate property. The Court erred in awarding Debra any 
portion of the convertible notes. 
The District Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision that a portion of the 
convertible notes were community property ruling as follows: 
The settlement agreement u~ambiguously provides that those 
retirement benefits accumulated during marriage are to be divided equally 
between the parties. The question is when the benefit of the convertible 
notes accumulated. The magistrate court correctly concluded that the 
convertible notes constituted benefits accumulated during the marriage. 
(R. p. 63). The magistrate court did conclude that the convertible notes constituted 
benefits accumulated during marriage. The magistrate court ruled as follows: 
The very wording included in the June 23,2006 question and answer 
document which is attached to Matthew Bolm's April 16,2007 affidavit 
and specifically the questions and answers to questions one and three 
clearly indicate that Kevin was receiving this as a "partial offset to the 
losses suffered by the pilots as a result of termination of their A Plan." 
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Clearly Debra has a commmity interest in the terminated "A Plan" and 
any partial offset for the loss of such "A Plan" would be rightfully a 
community asset. 
The problem arises though on how much of the convertible notes and 
their proceeds would be distributed as a community asset. Under the 
answers to question three it is clear that in calculating L\e losses on the 
termination of the "A Plan" the provisions under the bankruptcy order 
anticipated a lump sum distribution to all pilots employed on a certain date 
and to compensate them for past losses and losses in the future to ape 60. 
Clearly Debra has no right to receive any retirement benefits accrued 
by Kevin after the day of divorce . . . (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 38 - 39). The magistrate court did not conclude what portion of the convertible 
notes, if any, were accumulated during marriage. The magistrate court wanted to use the 
"time rule" to divide them as to a way to make that determination, however, the time rule 
allocation conflicts with the accrued benefit division that had already been zgreed to in 
paragraph 4 ofthe Property Settlement Agreement. In fact, if a portion of the convertible 
notes were accumulated during marriage then that portion would be divided on a 50 - 50 
basis pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement through a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. (R. p. 22). However, the convertible notes were not 
accumulated or acquired until February 1,2006 which was after the date of divorce, and 
as such, are Kevin's separate property. 
The District Court cites Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (2001) for the 
proposition that the convertible notes were actually accumulated during the marriage 
even though they did not vest until after marriage. The District Court's citation of m a  
is misplaced. First, deals with flights of stock options, not compensation for the 
loss of retirement benefits that would have continued to accrue until Kevin Smith's 
retirement sixteen years after the retirement benefits were terminated as a result of United 
Airline's bankruptcy. Second, -a divides the option based on a "time rule" method. 
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As set forth above, paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement adjudicated a 
division based upon the accrued benefit method. Since the collvertible notes accrued 
after marriage, they are Kevin Smith's separate property. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE MAGISTRATE 
COURT AND RULED THE STOCK ALLOCATION WAS AN OMITTED ASSET. 
Paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement provides in part: 
13. SEPAIUTE I'ROP1.:K?'\'/lNCOME AFTER SIGNIYG OF 
AGIWEMENT: The partis,: hereto stipulate and agree that from ant1 
aKeF the date of the signing of this Agreement, any and all property or 
income acquired or earned by either party hereto shall be the separate 
property of the partv who has acquired or earned it and the other party 
shall have no claim thereon. (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 24 - 25). The stock allocation Kevin received is clearly income he acquired after 
the filing of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce on September 22,2005 and as such, is 
covered by paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "acquire" in part as follows: 
Acquire. To gain by any means, usually by one's own exertions. In law 
of contracts and of descents, to become owner of property; to make 
property one's own. 
Black's Law Dictionary 12 (5" ed. 1983). Kevin did not become an owner of the stock 
allocation until February 1, 2006. The magistrate court recognized this when it ruled as 
follows: 
With regards to the stock allocation it is clear to this court pursuant to 
the February 9,2006 letter marked as Exhibit 3 to Matthew Bohn's 
affidavit of April 16,2007 the income received from the sale of United 
stock was paid to the pilots because they gave up significant compensation 
pursuant to work rules, work benefits, and regular compeilsation to allow 
for United airlines to go through and exit b h p t c y .  To actually receive 
the stock a pilot, in this case Kevin must have been employed by United 
Airlines on February 1,2006. If Kevin had quit or for some reason was 
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terminated by United Airlines prior to February 1,2006 then he would not 
have received the stock distributionlallocation. Therefore Kevin's 
continued employment with United airlines after the date of divorce of 
September 2005 makes the stock distribntion/allocation compensation that 
Kevin has earned by staying with the company UP through Februarv 1, 
2006. 
Therefore, based on the stipulated facts and the deposition of Debra 
and United Airlines documents reviewed by this court it is clear that the 
stock allocation would fall under paragraph 13 of the property settlement 
agreement and would be Kevin's sole and separate property. 
In order for the asset to be omitted it had to be unknown at the time of 
entering into the agreement. However it is clear that Debra was fully 
aware that Kevin may receive some compensation when United Airlines 
emerged from the bankruptcy proceeding and could have made provisions 
for that in this agreement. However, she chose, with this b-owledge of a 
possible income in the future, to sign an agreement where she indicates 
that any income received in the future would be each parties own separate 
property. (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 39 - 41). 
The District court confuses the fact that a portioil of the stock allocation may have 
related to Kevin's loss of work rules, compensation, etc. that may have occurred prior to 
the filing of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce with the fact that the stock allocation 
was covered by paragraph 13. For the sake of argument only, even if the District Court is 
correct that a portion of the stock allocation is community income, it was still divided by 
paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement as it was awarded to Kevin. Property 
Settlement Agreements divide community property in divorce cases. Furthermore, the 
District Court's citation of Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (2001) is once 
again misplaced. &a deals with stock options. The stock allocation was not a stock 
option that was subject to vesting rules. The stock allocation was compensation paid as 
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consideration for the United Airline pilots agreeing to the restructuring of their labor 
contract in the bankruptcy proceedings wherein the pilots made substantial concessions. 
VI. 
KEVIN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS HE HAS I N C U m D  
ON APPEAL AND AS A RESULT OF DEBRA'S CROSS APPEAL. 
Kevin should be awarded his attomey fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rules 40 and 41 and paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement attached to 
the September 22,2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce, which states the following: 
15.03. If an action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this 
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing party all 
costs and attomey fees incurred in that action. 
(R. p. 25). 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate court had no jurisdiction in this action because the Property 
Settlement Agreement was not merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
Regardless, as soon as the magistrate court determined that the convertible notes were not 
an omitted asset he should have dismissed Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset for 
lack of jurisdiction because of the doctrine of res judicata. Further, the magistrate court's 
decision awarding Debra a portion of the convertible notes should be reversed as the 
convertible notes are Kevin's separate property. 
With regard to the stock allocation, the magistrate court was absolutely correct 
when it determined the stock allocation was not an omitted asset and was awarded to 
Kevin as his separate property. The District Court's decision should be reversed as to the 
stock allocation. 
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Finally, Kevin should be awarded his attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Attorney for Defendant 1 Appellant 
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